The research of this article is ensuring the security implementation of multi-domain secure access control behaviour, through the study on unified description language for security policy, strategy conflict classification and strategy conflict detection. Based on current related technologies and combined with the feature of multi-domain system, the framework of access control strategy management is proposed, which specified the content of access control management. We adopt XACML that has better across-platform and scalability to describe the policy uniformly. Then access control policy description template based on XACML is provided and the security policy conflict is classified reasonably according to the factors causing conflict. Then we put forward a model to detect the inconsistency of RBAC and RH in time and space constraint, to design an access control model which needs pruning and collection. It uses logic analysis to strength the conflict detection for developing security policy integration. The simulation shows our work can provide filter on quantities of irrelevant policy and return potential policies to solute the conflict.
Introduction
Traditional multilevel security policies mainly implement multi-level information access control in a single system environment, and can not meet the security requirements of information access rights allocation and adjustment in multi-level interconnected systems. As a powerful technological means and important policy, it is significant for access control to ensure the network security. It indeed allows or limits access of subject on object through strict security access control rules so as to guarantee effective operation under condition of secure and legal network.
Under condition of following access control policy, it is possible for access subject to legally access object. At present, access control technologies in broad application are discretionary access control, DAC, mandatory access control，MAC and role-based access control, RBAC (Jie et al., 2011; Cirio et al., 2007) . Mandatory access control is suitable to be applied in multi-level network but role-based access control is suitable to be applied to large-scaled multidomain network. With constantly enlarging networked scale, quantity and application scenarios in network resource gradually increase. Various departments communication in the society constantly enhances and cooperation among various domains gradually increases so that the requirement of information exchange and resource share continuously improves. It gradually appears distributing development tendency. In particular, under multi-domain networked environment, each network domain has respective security requirement and networked environment is more complex and flexible. All these aspects put forward new challenges in access control technology and an effective access control mechanism is significant. Traditional access control models do not have effective adaptability under current network environment so it is essential to design a newly-scaled access control model to satisfy currently and newly complicated network requirements.
As a classical representative of multi-security access control model, BLP (Liang, 2014) effectively limits illegal flow of information from high-security to low-security through distributing secure labels so as to guarantee information confidentiality. However, there are defects of BLP model such as lacking security, flexible authorisation system, non-traverse flow of information between departments and non-adaptability during cross multi-network. Based on BLP model, Biba (Zhou et al., 2013) adopts similar method of BLP model to protect information integrity. However, its description is actually the duality of BLP model and Biba model lacks confidentiality control. Sandhu (Zhou et al., 2013) points that although BLP model and Biba model have different representations but they are grid-based information flow model in essence and their following policies can be described as unidirectional information flow. Dion (Liu and Chen, 2014) proposes combination between BLP model and Biba model. He controls information flow through information layer and information isolation. Although introduction to layer and isolation enhances model security, there cannot be shared between groups and layers. This leads that they must depend on other software to realise information share between different layers and groups so as to increase system burden. Liu (Sun, 2013) strictly limits upgoing information flow in BLP model and realises integrity and confidentiality of model through compulsive information flow restriction and this restriction has not generated large influence on information flow of BLP model. Qu et al. (Yu, 2008) put forward another networked model based on credibility. Subject and object of this model have respective security-level and confidentiality-level. Under grid theory condition, Shen (Tang et al., 2016) puts forward a BLP extended model and BLP-I model based on comprehensively considering confidentiality and integrity of model. This model effectively solves quiet principle of BLP model and dynamic principle of Biba model. All these above models improve BLP model functions based on BLP model and are still adapted to access control of single-network domain. They still do not have adaptability towards access control in multi-domain network. Based on mapping mechanism-based multi-network domain secure access control models, this paper offers multi-network domain and multi-levelled secure access control strategy management framework. The paper adopts XACML language to comprehensively describe access policy and formulates policy template. Concerning current defects of access control policy in consistency detection, this management framework puts forward incomplete detection in access control policy and provides guarantee with correct authorisation in access control behaviour. It designs and realises policy management simulation system inside access control domain. This system realises policy writing, policy guide and policy consistency detection. Related cases are used to test simulation system, analyse test results and verify the accuracy of policy consistency detection algorithm.
The paper is organised as follows. The literature review is discussed in the following section. This is followed by a explanation of multi-domain security access control model. Then Section 3 proposed XACML-based management policy and Section 4 offers some case to verify the performance of our strategy. The last section will conclude our work.
2 Multi-domain security access control model
Overall framework of the model
There are mainly two parts of multi-domain security model: intra-domain access control and inter-domain access control. Therefore, after each access request proposition, intra-domain access and inter-domain access must be judged. Intra-domain access control performs strict multi-levelled secure access control model, compares security level between subject and object through strict multi-levelled security policy and finally operates access judgement. It realises secure flow of information, avoids information leakage as well as destruction, and guarantees the security of intra-domain access control. This paper puts forward various performance information such as subject, object and environment rather than single rule attribute information to realise more detailed and accurate inter-domain mapping. Combined with the requirement of multi-network domain and multi-levelled secure access control model, the paper selects aiming performance information such as subject, object and environment (Unal and Caglayan, 2015) and quantifies qualitative performance information into quantitative value through hierarchical quantification. Through multi-performance decision algorithm, it combines with performance information quantification value to calculate initial mapping value and correct mapping value through environmental performance. It creatively selects credibility attribute to adjust mapping value, to obtain final mapping value and realise dynamic adjustment of mapping value. The system determines the security degree of access subject in target domain. After that, the subject is seen as legal member in this domain, accesses multi-levelled secure access control policy according to this domain and realises secure, effective and dynamic inter-domain access control. The general framework of multi-network domain and multi-secure access control model is shown as Figure 1 .
Inter-domain access control
Inter-domain access control is more complex and changeable than intra-domain access control because all subject and object are in the same networked domain under intra-domain access control. Furthermore, each member is constructed according to the network requirement in unified system no matter in expression and realisation. They also follow common access control policy without heterogeneity so model design and policy formulation are comparatively simpler but inter-access control is different. Its access request crosses two networked domains and these two networked domains do not necessarily have the same or similar network system structure with heterogeneity. Meanwhile, each network domain has respective networked requirement and each component within domain is different in expression or realisation. Furthermore, it follows respective local access control policy which has large heterogeneity. Access request and fast environmental factor change of subject bring difficulty and problem in secure interactive operation inside domains. Therefore, in order to realise effective inter-domain access control, it puts forward an effective inter-domain access control mechanism to realise effectiveness and security of inter-domain access control. In the process of inter-domain access control, it mainly contains inter-domain mapping calculation and inter-domain access. As the core of inter-domain mapping calculation, inter-domain manager mainly contains performance-receiving authentication module, performance mapping calculation module, grade-calculation module and reputation management module (Martínezgarcía et al., 2009) .
For multi-domain security access control model, it is closely related to policy support to endure security and effectiveness. Towards multi-levelled secure access control requirement under multi-domain environment, forward analysis and inverse integration are used to judge equivalent node and sub-node so as to construct subject-resource combined directed acyclic graph. Then, through accuracy and integration of policy conflict detection and complete detection, the policy will be finally guided into model in order to ensure the effectiveness and security of this model.
Multi-domain secure access control policy management

XACML-based policy uniform description
XACML (Ardagna et al., 2016 ) is an XML-based open standard language and its design is used to describe secure policy and access limitation for networked service, digital copyright management and enterprise security application information. XACML is structurally clear in policy expression. Secure rules are expressed as attribute value set of subject, object, behaviour and restriction. XACML policy expression example is seen in Figure 4 . XACML is an XML-based the assigned language of access control policy and it uses label to identify various elements of secure policy. XACML label specifies policy name, rule name and rule attribute with abundant variety. As is shown by Figure 2 
Security access control policy management framework
In a multi domain environment, intra domain policy refers to a set of access control rules that are setup by an administrator within a multilevel system. Inter domain policy refers to a rule set made by the domain administrator to restrict the access to the domain resource by foreign body. In multilevel systems, administrators formulate the rules pf intra domain policies and inter domain policies to restrict foreign body to access the domain resource. After XACML language description, inter domain policies is directly issued to the management strategy for inter domain; domain strategy is sent to the pre-treatment model for conflict detection of policy and strategy of completeness detection through strategy analysis and strategy integration. Eventually correct and effective access control strategy is sent to inter domain access control model as the basis of behaviour authorised. Figure 3 depicts the management framework of the of multi-domain secure access control policies. The access control policy is described in XACML language in this paper, which is essentially a XML file. Analysis of the strategy is to parse the XML file, and extract the file access control information. The resourced accessed by the same object are merge into a set. Pre-processing method refers to the access control system before the operation for the system's access control policy for complete detection and conflict detection, providing correct and effective access control strategy for the implementation of system access control. The inter domain policy manager is responsible for inter domain access control, attribute management of constraint rules, and sharing the same domain policy manager by multiple domains.
Inconsistency detection
We propose a role hierarchy-based detection model which is different from RBAC in constraint in time and space. The improved model is designed based on the access control from different organisations requiring pruning and collecting policies. The strategy develops policy integration by logical reasoning technique, to strength the policies of inconsistency detection. It is believed that such work can provide a model to filter quantity of unrelated policies and return potential cooperation policies for conflict solutions. Each organisation can independently specify its own security policy. Therefore, we aim to filter unrelated policies and analyse the inconsistent types among the cooperation policies of different organisations. Figure 4 depicts our model for security integration process which is composed by two phrases: policy pruning and policy inconsistency detection. The pruning phase filters the unrelated policies of organisation that participated before. In there is a similar policy, the two policies will be potential candidates for the next phase, that is, before a common comprehensive policy is formulated, at the phase of policy inconsistency detection. The following cases indicate the working principle of pruning phrase by our model.
For example, A 1 and B 1 will not have further checking since the analysis indicates the role elements of these two policies are different. Therefore, policy A 1 and B 1 will be pruned out at this phase. Its formal description is:
Similarly we can conclude the other four definitions:
It is not recommended to establish policies set shared by a group of cooperation organisations at this phase. These policies are determined as potential candidates to be posted to the next phase, that is, inconsistency detection phase, for further detail checking. After pruning phase unrelated policies will be filtered and related policies are further analysed. At this phase we check condition and effect of the elements. Two cases are determined to show the following policies:
For example, policy A 1 and B 2 are considered to be similar after pruning. We find that A 1 has more limitation in time and space condition than B 2 . Then it needs further negotiation in inconsistency decision and it is impossible to make a decision without analysing the content of conditions in detail. We separate these possible policies into constraints inconsistencies.
If A 3 and B 1 are considered to be similar after pruning. In the elements, we find there is determined space information in A 3 and the denial access decision is the same as the space conditions of B 1 that has license access policy. We have to make decision with the consideration of this case. Thus, we classify it as inconsistent decision and it needs further authority of inconsistent negotiations.
Experimental analysis
Inter-domain access control realisation
The multi-level structure of this domain and target domain is shown as Figure 5 . The left one is source domain while the right one is target domain. For inter-domain access, in this experiment we assume that the object which subject will access has been determined in this target. Meanwhile, 1 is defined as the highest security level in target domain and 6 is the lowest security level. Towards object 1, its security level is 1 so its security level is high. However, towards object 9, its security level is 5 so its security level is low. According to access control policy requirement, only when subject security level value is smaller than object security level value to be accessed after inter-domain mapping, can inter-domain access. According to actual access request, we put forward various access requests based on different attributes of each subject and through experiment to simulate and verify access request, the final access judgements are obtained:
1 Inter-domain access scenario 1. Domain subject A accesses target domain object 4. After subject A performs inter-domain mapping, its security level is 3 and object security level is 3. This matches inter-domain access control policy and allows its access.
2 Inter-domain access scenario 2. Domain subject b accesses target domain object 2. After inter-domain mapping, security level of subject B is 4 and object security level is 2. This does not match inter-domain access control policy so it does not allow its access.
3 Inter-domain access scenario 3. Domain subject B accesses target domain object 9. After inter-domain mapping, security level of subject B is 5 and security level of object is 5. This matches inter-domain access control policy so it allows its access.
4 Inter-domain access scenario 4. Domain subject C accesses target domain object 4. After inter-domain mapping, security level of subject C is 4 and security level of object is 4. This does not match inter-domain access control strategy so it does not allow its access.
5 Inter-domain access scenario 5. This domain subject C accesses target-domain object 4. Subject-object information and judgement results of above 5 inter-domain access requests are shown as Table 1 .
Through above comparison, it indicates that subject attribute, environmental attribute and subject reputation in this paper will affect inter-domain mapping calculation results in different degrees and further influence access of subject in target domain. It verifies the rationality and the effectiveness of inter-domain mapping algorithm in this paper, which allows legal access request, prohibits illegal access request, realises effective control of inter-domain access and ensures the security of inter-domain access control.
Performance test
The implementation of improved scheme is realised on .NET platform and MSSQL is set as the database to store XACML policy. To evaluate the conflict detection mechanism, we perform the test with 50 XACML policies which are established by self-defined policy specification tools. These policies contain different topics, resource or actions to be executed on them. The policies, objects, rules and conditions are expressed by appropriate XACML format using policy specification tools. Different number of conflict on subjects, resources and actions are determined. We inject recognised conflict to a group of XACML policies by updated policies, rules or condition tags. The performance is evaluated by the overhead of detection time caused by different conflict. For the evaluation test we determine 25 types of different conflict to be injected and the following figure describes the time to be taken during single conflict detection in a group of 50 policies. The experiment also individually increases the conflict in the database, so we need to pay attention to the time cost on all conflicts at special hour for the detection algorithm. Figure 7 depicts the detailed information of a group of XAMCL policies with the number of 50, 100 and 200. From the results it can be seen that the time cost gets linear growth obviously with the increase of conflict number and policy number in database. It does not increase with time goes on so the approach is feasible. 
Conclusions
In order to maximally satisfy the resources sharing between domains and protect information security inside domain, we need an access control system which satisfies multi-domain security requirement. Access control strategy management is one necessary part in access control system. Based on current studies, this paper combines with multi-networked domains and multi-levelled systems to offer the framework of access control strategy management and clarify access control management content. A model for detecting the inconsistency between RBAC and RH under the constraints of time and space is proposed, and an access control model which needs pruning and collection is designed. It adopts effective cross-platform and expanding XACML language for policy comprehensible description, offers XACML language-based access control policy description template and reasonably classify secure strategy conflict according to different reasons of secure policy conflict. The policy takes into account the rule hierarchy structure and restriction between time and system in policy inconsistency detection. The proposed policy inconsistency detection model can determine all kinds of inconsistency among policies. The test results verify the accuracy of strategic consistency detection algorithm during model construction. Compared to other models, it cannot only detect common policy conflict but can also detect policy completeness. Thus, it provides more effective policy basis with operating control behaviour and also is adaptable to other domains.
